Sovereign, non-geostationary satellite-orbit space capability is poised to increase dramatically over the next decade and many countries view sovereign capability in space as a national security imperative.
The European Commission’s planned IRIS² program will link 348 satellites – 18 in medium Earth orbit and 330 in low Earth orbit – intended to give every EU member state secure government connectivity from the 2030s onward. Germany is pursuing its own path with SATCOMBw Stage 4, a planned military constellation of approximately 200 satellites valued at nearly 10 billion euros. South Korea has set 2035 as its target for a sovereign low Earth orbit defense network known as K-LEO. And Australia is working through SPA 9102, a market exploration effort focused on developing a multi-orbit sovereign communications capability.
No one questions whether these systems are required. The more pressing question might be: when will they be operational, and should they be designed to operate independently?Â
Sovereignty does not mean operating alone
While nations are investing in sovereign capabilities to reduce dependence on others, the reality is that in times of conflict and stress, they will rarely act alone. NATO missions, coalition operations, and multinational defense initiatives critically depend on information sharing across national forces and platforms.
True sovereignty is the ability to control capability and effects on national terms, not necessarily operate in isolation. As sovereign constellations are being conceived today, planners should ask themselves not only how they will serve national missions, but how they will integrate into broader allied architectures.
The proliferated model depends on interoperability
Interoperability allows sovereign systems to become part of a resilient allied ecosystem rather than a collection of segregated and independent networks.
The U.S. Space Development Agency’s Optical Communications Terminal standard is one of the clearest examples of what this looks like in practice. It establishes a common framework that enables optical terminals from different vendors to communicate with each other, allowing SDA to integrate satellites from multiple manufacturers into a unified space data transport network. As commercial operators adopt the standard, they create opportunities for future interoperability between government, allied and commercial space relay architectures.
Rather than lock the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture to a single supplier, the standard lets government buyers add capacity from multiple sources as needs evolve. That is what a proliferated architecture requires: components that seamlessly work together. And it’s very much in line with the Allied by Design approach the Space Force has proposed, codified in its International Partnership Strategy released in July 2025.
In addition to space data relay interoperability, user terminals need to interoperate as well. For a proliferated strategy to work, the terminals on the ground need to work across more than one network. Telesat Lightspeed takes an open-architecture approach to terminals, working with multiple manufacturers rather than building a single proprietary design, so government customers gain flexibility and are not locked to one vendor.
South Korea’s K-LEO program is an early test case for what that flexibility can look like between sovereign systems. In January 2026, Telesat and Hanwha Systems signed an agreement to jointly develop defense user terminals compatible with both K-LEO and Telesat Lightspeed, so that a single terminal could draw on either network depending on mission requirements. It’s a concrete example of allied by design, partnering with a commercial partner to provide maximum flexibility for evolving SATCOM needs and leveraging a ‘system of systems’ approach.
But interoperability alone is not enough. Governments also need confidence that interconnected networks can be trusted.
Interoperability only works with strong security
Open architectures create flexibility and resiliency, but they also increase the importance of cybersecurity. Security cannot be layered onto allied architectures after deployment. It must be designed into them from the start.
Security requirements need to be part of that same design, not an afterthought layered on top. Telesat is incorporating more than 400 controls from the U.S. Space Force’s Infrastructure Asset Pre-Assessment Program (IA-PRE), an objective cybersecurity risk assessment against the National Institute of Standards and Technology controls. That work sits alongside protections such as frequency hopping, terminal location obfuscation, and a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center. A proliferated network is resilient only if all elements are trusted.
Bridging the capability gap
Many sovereign programs still face years of development before reaching full operational capability. Yet governments face growing operational requirements today and it is critical that they maintain resilient communications while potential sovereign systems are being developed. Maintaining resilient communications throughout this transition period is an important strategic consideration.
Telesat Lightspeed is on track for global service in the first quarter of 2028, years ahead of several sovereign programs currently under consideration. That timeline provides government customers with access to a secure network that can support mission requirements as sovereign capabilities continue to mature. However, the role of commercial networks need not end once sovereign systems become operational.
Commercial and sovereign systems are stronger together
If programs such as IRIS² or K-LEO are designed for interoperability from the outset, they can operate alongside commercial networks rather than displace them, adding resilience, surge capacity, and redundancy where and when needed.
The objective should not be to create separate sovereign and commercial ecosystems. It should be to create an environment where governments can draw on trusted capabilities across both solutions when circumstances require it.
There is also an important investment consideration. As defense departments leverage commercial networks to meet operational requirements while sovereign systems are still being developed, they must invest in user terminals and ground infrastructure. If those terminals are designed for interoperability from the start, they remain valuable long after sovereign constellations become operational. Rather than replacing equipment as new networks come online, governments can continue to leverage existing investments across both commercial and sovereign systems. This reduces lifecycle costs, increases flexibility, and allows operators to access the network best suited to a particular mission or operational environment.
The challenge for governments isn’t choosing between sovereign and commercial capability. It’s making sure the two can work together when it counts the most.
The most resilient space architectures of the next decade won’t be defined by any single constellation, sovereign or commercial. They will be defined by how well government and commercial networks work together. Sovereign capability remains essential, but interoperability transforms individual networks into a resilient, proliferated ecosystem that supports evolving mission requirements.
